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Summary findings
Kraay and Monokroussos consider two alternative  (across countries) forecast performance are small relative
methods of forecasting real per capita GDP at various  to the large discrepancies between forecasts and actual
horizons:  outcomes.
* Univariate time series models estimated  Interestingly, the performance of both models is
country by country.  similar to that of forecasts generated by the World
* Cross-country growth regressions.  Bank's Unified Survey.
They evaluate the out-of-sample forecasting  The results do not provide a compelling case for one
performance of both approaches for a large sample of  approach over another, but they do indicate that there
industrial and developing countries.  are potential gains from combining time series and
They find only modest differences between the two  growth-regression-based forecasting approaches.
approaches. In almost all cases, differences in median
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In developed  countries,  a vast range  of forecasting  tools have been  used to
predict  growth and other  economic  variables  of interest.  In contrast,  growth  projections
for many  developing  countries  are typically  based  on much  more informal  techniques.
For example,  both  the World Bank  and  the International  Monetary  Fund  rely  largely  on
the informed  judgement  of their country  economists  to produce  forecasts  for internal  and
external  use. 1 In this paper,  we consider  two simple  formal models  for forecasting
growth  in a large  sample  of developed  and developing  countries:  univariate  time series
models  estimated  country-by-country,  and cross-country  growth regressions.  The time
series  models  constitute  a useful benchmark  which illustrates  how well forecasts  based
on extremely  limited  information  (only the history  of per capita  GDP itself) can perform.
The growth regressions  are of interest  given  the vast empirical  literature  which  argues
that a significant  fraction  of the cross-country  and time series  variation  in longer-term
growth rates  can be explained  by a fairly  parsimonious  set of explanatory  variables. A
natural  question  to ask is whether  this popular  empirical  framework  has any  value  for
predicting  future  growth.
We consider  the relative  forecast  performance  of two straighfforward  models.
Our time series model  is very simple,  and models  (the logarithm  of) real per capita  GDP
as following  a first-order  autoregressive  process  around  a broken  trend. We estimate
this model  country-by-country  for 112 countries,  for two time periods: 1960-1980,  and
1960-1990.  We then generate  out-of-sample  forecasts  for the remaining  years  through
1997  based  on these  two information  sets,  and compare  these  forecasts  with actual
outcomes. Our growth  model  follows  the vast empirical  literature  spawned  by the
neoclassical  growth model. We estimate  a dynamic  panel  regression  of (the logarithm
of) real per capita  GDP on itself  lagged  five years,  and a number  of lagged  explanatory
variables  which proxy  for the steady-state  of the neoclassical  growth model  and capture
the effects  of various  policies  on long-run  growth: investment,  population  growth,  trade
openness,  inflation,  and the black market  premium. We estimate  this model using  non-
1 The  World Bank's  Unified  Survey  projections,  and  the IMF's  World  Economic  Outlook  projections  are
produced  in this  way. Both  organizations  also  use large  macroeconometric  models: the World Bank's
Global  Economic  Model  (GEM)  is used  to produce  forecasts  appearing  in the Bank's  annual  Global
Economic  Prospects  publication,  and  the IMF  maintains  MULTIMOD  for research  and  simulation  purposes.
Ioverlapping  quinquennial  averages  of data  over  the same  two periods  as for the time
series  model  (although  for a somewhat  smaller  sample  of countries  as dictated  by data
availability),  and then  generate  forecasts  for the remaining  years in the sample  which
can be compared  to actual outcomes. In order  to benchmark  the forecasts  generated  by
these models  against  current  practice,  we also make  some  comparisons  with long-term
forecasts  produced  by the World Bank's  Unified  Survey  in 1990.  However,  our primary
interest  is in the relative  performance  of the time series and growth  models.  2
We assess  the out-of-sample  forecast  performance  of these  models  using
standard  summary  statistics  which  capture  their bias and mean  squared  error. These
statistics  suggest  small median  (across  countries)  differences  in forecast  performance  of
the alternative  models,  which  vary with the forecast  horizon. For example,  there  is some
evidence  -- consistent  with  our priors  -- that the mean  squared  error of growth  regression
based  forecasts  is smaller  at long  forecast  horizons  (five  years  or more). However,
these differences  in median  forecast  performance  are typically  very small relative  to the
cross-country  dispersion  in forecast  performance,  casting  doubt on the significance  of
observed  "typical"  differences. The relative  performance  of the altemative  forecasting
models  is also very unstable  over  time within  countries. We test for and do not reject  the
null hypothesis  that the past relative  performance  of the growth model  and the time
series model  in a particular  country  is independent  of the future relative  performance  of
the two models  in that country.
These  results  indicate  that neither  forecasting  model  dominates,  both  across
countries  and within countries  over  time. Rather  than attempt  to choose  a single  "best"
forecasting  model, we instead  ask whether  there is value in combining  the forecasts  of
alternative  models. We implement  forecast  encompassing  tests and find evidence  that
these  approaches  can "learn  from each other",  in the sense  that the forecasts  from both
models  are  jointly significant  in explaining  actual  outcomes.  This is especially  true at
shorter  horizons,  and it suggests  that there are potential  benefits  from combining  these
forecasts  in some  way to arrive  at a superior  overall  method.
2For  a more  systematic  assessment  of  the  quality  of  World  Bank  forecasts,  see  Ghosh  and  Minhas  (1993),
and  Verbeek  (1999). Artis (1996)  does  the same  for the IMF's  short-term  forecasts.
2The remainder  of this paper  proceeds  as follows. In the next  section,  we present
the two models  used  to produce  growth  forecasts,  and note  the similarities  and
differences  between  them. In Section  3, we examine  the cross-country  performance  of
these  forecasts  using  various  summary  statistics. In Section  4, we illustrate  the results
of our  forecast  encompassing  tests, and consider  whether  a combined  forecast  can
outperform  either of the two alternatives.  We also briefly  consider  whether  the absolute
performance  of either model  is adequate. Section  5 offers some  concluding  remarks.
32. Forecasting  Models
In this section  we describe  the simple  time series and  growth models  we use  to
forecast  real per capita  GDP in a large  sample  of developed  and developing  countries.
2.1. Time Series  Forecasts
For each country,  we estimate  a very  simple  first-order  autoregressive  process
around  a linear  trend,  allowing  for the possibility  that the trend  of the series changes
once within  the estimation  period. In particular,  we assume  that the logarithm  of real per
capita GDP in country  i at time t, yit,  is described  by the following  process:
(1)  Yit = Pi - Yi,t-1  + bit + sit
The trend  term bit  is a linear  function  of time, and both the slope and the intercept  term
may change  at a date  T within  the estimation  period,  i.e.  bit = pi + 0 *  DT + .3 t + y  DO
where DT is a dummy  variable  taking on  the value I if t>T and zero otherwise,  and D-
is a dummy  variable  taking on the value  t-T if t>T and zero  otherwise. The two dummy
variables  pick  up a shift in the deterministic  component  of output  that occurs  in year T.
The date of the trend break,  T, is determined  endogeneously,  using  the procedure  of
sequential  Wald tests  suggested  by Vogelsang  (1997).3  At the estimation  stage,  we do
not need  to make  strong  assumptions  about  the properties  of the error  term. However,
for the purposes  of formal  tests  of model  performance,  it will be useful  to assume  that
the error  term is independent  over  time and is normally  distributed  with variance  I2
In order  to evaluate  the forecasting  performance  of this model,  we divide  the
sample  period  in two at a particular  year  t. We then estimate  Equation  (1) using  the data
available  until this year t, and then use  the model  to forecast  the log-level  of per  capita
3 However,  we do not pre-test  for a trend  break,  i.e. we allow  for a trend break  at time T even  if this break  is
not statistically  significant.  There  is some  evidence  that forecasts  based  on pre-tested  models  perform
better  than  either  of the altemative  models  that are being  pre-tested  (Diebold  and Kilian  (1999)  perform
Monte  Carlo  experiments,  and Stock  and  Watson  (1998)  show  this empirically  in a large-scale  comparison
of many  forecasting  models  of various  macroeconomic  aggregates  for the United  States). This suggests
that the forecasting  performance  of both  the time series  model  and the growth  model  might  be improved  by
pretesting.
4GDP  for each  subsequent  year. In particular,  if we divide  the sample  in two at year  t, our
forecast  of per  capita GDP  for each subsequent  year  is:
(2)  Yit+slt  =  i  Yit +  6it+S
where yi t+,It  denotes  the forecast  of Yi,t+s  based  on information  available  at time t
and pi and 6it+, are  the parameter  estimates  for country  i based  on its data available
through  year  t.  Ignoring  the uncertainty  associated  with  the parameter  estimates,  i.e.
assuming  the parameters  of the model  are  known,  the corresponding  forecast  error  is:
s-1
(3)  eit+slt  =Di  *  6i,t+s-h
h=O
The variance  of this error  term can be used  to construct  the ex ante  forecast  confidence
intervals  associated  with each  forecast,  which  will depend  on the autoregressive
parameter,  pi , and the variance  of the error  term, a'.  Replacing  these  with their
estimates  yields  the usual  ex ante  forecast  confidence  intervals. 4
Our data consists  of a panel  of 1  12  countries  for which a complete  time series  on
real per capita  GDP adjusted  for differences  in purchasing  power  parity  is available  over
the period  1960-1997.5  We estimate  this model  twice  for each country,  once using  data
over  the period  1960-1980,  and once  over  the period  1960-1990.  We then generate
forecasts  of real per  capita GDP  for the remaining  years  through 1997  for each country,
and compare  these  forecasts  with  the actual  realizations  of per capita GDP  for each
country.
4In  particular,  a 90%  forecast  confidence  interval  extends  ± 1.64.  - p2s . around  the forecast  itself.
52.1. Forecasts  based  on cross-country  growth regressions
The cross-country  growth  regressions  we consider  differ from the simple  time-
series model  in three important  respects. First, unlike  the time series model,  the growth
regression  has  a clear theoretical  motivation  which permits  the inclusion  of country-
specific  explanatory  variables  into the model. Second,  the growth  regression  is typically
estimated  using  longer  averages  of data  over non-overlapping  periods  rather  than
annual observations.  Third,  the many  of the parameters  of the growth  model are
restricted  to be equal across  countries. We discuss  each of these differences  in turn.
The theoretical  motivation  for many  cross-country  growth  regressions  is the
prediction  of the neoclassical  growth  model  for the dynamics  of per capita  output  around
its steady  state. A fundamental  prediction  of this model  is that per  capita GDP growth
declines  as per capita  GDP approaches  its steady-state  level, i.e.
(4)  Yj,t  - Y 1 ,t-i = (1  - pi), (Yd  -Y*
where  yit*  denotes  the steady  state  of country  i at time t (note  that the steady  state may
itself evolve  over  time), and pi denotes  the annual  rate of convergence  in country  i.
Adding  an error  term which  captures  deviations  between  this model  of the long run and
reality,  and rearranging,  yields  an empirical  specification  which is very similar  to the time
series  model  in Equation  (1):
(5)  yi, -=  Pi *  yj.t_.  + (1 - pi) *  yit * +6it
This illustrates  the first difference  between  the time series model  and the growth  model.
In the growth  model,  growth  theory  provides  variables  that can  serve  as proxies  for the
steady  state,  yjt*,  and hence  permit  empirical  estimation  of Equation  (5). In constrast,
the time series model  can be thought  of as proxying  the steady  state log-level  of income
for each country  with a country-specific  trend  (with  a possible  break).
5  The  data  is drawn  from  the  Penn  World  Table  Version  5.6  (RGDPCH)  and  is extended  through  1997  using
World  Bank  constant  price  local  currency  growth  rates.
6The second  difference  between  the two models  is that the growth  regression  is
typically  estimated  using (possibly  a panel)  of long-run  averages  of both  GDP and the
proxies  for the steady  state. To see the consequences  of this, we can iterate  Equation
(5) forward  for T periods,  corresponding  to a growth  regression  estimated  using  T-year
average growth rates:
T-1
T  itphTpi)  +8
(6)  Yi,t+T Pi  Yi,t +  j  *  it+T-h  +  it+T-h)
h=O
To empirically  implement  this equation,  we require  proxies  for the (possibly  changing)
steady  state of the economy  between  periods  t and t+T. These are usually  taken  to be
averages  over  the same  period  of variables  such  as population  growth,  the investment
rate, various  measures  of policies  which  affect  the long-term  growth  prospects  of a
country,  and possibly  an unobserved  country-specific  effect. In particular,  it is typically
assumed  that  Yt+Th =y  + jpix  , where  xit  is a vector  of such  proxies  for  the  steady
state and .,  is an unobserved  country-specific  effect. Inserting  this into Equation  (6)
gives the standard  cross-country  growth  regression:
(7)  =  T .T  (t  i  i  i Yi,t+T Pi  Yit+(1p)
T-1
where V,t = 
8 Pij  * 6it+T-h  is a composite  error  term reflecting  all of the annual  shocks
h=O
that occurred  between  t and t+T.
The third difference  between  the growth model  and the time series model  is that
the growth  model  is estimated  pooling  data  for many  countries  and restricting  most of
the parameters  in Equation  (7) to be the same  across  countries,  while the time series
model  is estimated  country-by-country  and imposes  no  such restrictions. In particular,
we estimate  the growth model  in Equation  (7) using  a panel  of non-overlapping
quinquennial  averages,  restricting  p and ,B  to be  the same  across  countries. We treat
the country-specific  effects  1i,  as unobserved,  and estimate  the model using  the GMM
system estimator  for dynamic  panels  suggested  by Arellano  and Bover  (1995). This
7method is superior  to simple  pooled  OLS or IV  estimation  of Equation  (7) because  it
allows  for a consistent  treatment  and estimation  of the individual  effects.6
As with the time series  model,  we estimate  the growth regression  in Equation  (7)
twice, using  data available  through  1980,  and data available  through 1990,  and then
project  real per capita  GDP  forward  for the remaining  years in the sample  using  the
estimated  parameters  as follows:
(8)  9i,t+slt  =  s.Yit  + (1  _ ps)*  + 3,'xt)
Again ignoring  the uncertainty  associated  with  the parameter  estimates,  this results  in
exactly  the same  forecast  error  as for the time series model,  except  that the
autoregressive  parameter  p is now  the same  for all countries:
s-I
(9)  ei,t+,It  =  2..Ps  'i,t+s-h
h=o
This expression  can be used to construct  ex ante  forecast  confidence  intervals  in the
same  way  as for the time series model.
We implement  the growth model  using  an unbalanced  panel  of non-overlapping
quinquennial  data over  the period  1961-1995,  T=5.  The vector  of explanatory  variables
xit  consists  of a constant,  the logarithm  of the investment  rate, the logarithm  of the
population  growth  rate, the logarithm  of one plus the CPI inflation  rate, the logarithm  of
one plus the black market  premium,  and the share of trade in GDP. The first two
variables  follow  the predictions  of the textbook  Solow  model. The last  three variables
can be interpreted  as summary  indicators  of policy. We begin  with the same  sample  of
countries  as with the time series models,  but we can only estimate  the growth
regressions  for a somewhat  smaller  sample  due to missing  values  for some  of the
explanatory  variables.
6  We also  considered  the forecasting  performance  of a growth  model  estimated  using  OLS,  which  has the
convenience  of much  simpler  implementation.  Despite  the theoretical  advantages  of the dynamic  panel
model,  the ex post  forecast  performance  of  the dynamic  panel  model  is not consistently  better  than that  of
the simple  OLS  model.
8We estimate  (7) using averages  of the variables  in xit  in the five years prior  to t.
We do this because  when  we turn to the growth  forecasts  in Equation  (8), we can
generate  forecasts  without also having  to forecast  each of the explanatory  variables  in
the growth regression.  At the estimation  stage,  this approach  also has the advantage  of
alleviating  some  of the concerns  about  the endogeneity  of contemporaneous  values  of
the "growth  determinants"  in most  empirical  growth  specifications.  The disadvantage  of
this is that this growth regression  does not fit the data  as well as a regression  which
uses  contemporaneous  values  of the explanatory  variables: the average  of a growth
determinant  over  (t,t+T)  is typically  a better  explanator  of growth  over (t,t+T)  than is the
average  of the same  variable  over  (t-T, t). However,  forecasts  of real per capita  GDP
based  on such a model  would also require  forecasts  of each  of the explanatory  variables
in the growth  regression. 7
The results  of estimating  Equation  (7) for the two information  sets are shown  in
Table 1. As a benchmark,  we report  estimates  using  OLS on the pooled  sample  of five-
year averages,  and also our preferred  specification  based  on the system  GMM  estimator
for dynamic  panel  data. The results  are broadly  consistent  with both intuition  and
existing  results. The lagged  level  of income  enters  significantly  with a coefficient  less
than one in all cases,  and is smaller  (implying  a higher  estimated  rate of convergence)
for the GMM  estimator. Population  growth  and investment  are always  highly  significant,
and the magnitude  of the estimated  coefficients  are reasonably  stable. Openness  and
the black  market  premium  generally  enter  with the expected  signs,  but are not
consistently  significant. Unfortunately  inflation  often enters  with a perverse  positive  sign,
although  it is only significant  when it is negative. The less-than-stellar  performance  of
the policy  variables  in the growth  regression  is somewhat  disappointing,  and is in part
due to the fact that these are lagged  policy  variables,  rather  than contemporaneous.
In summary,  the time series model  and the growth model  can be  thought of as
special  cases  of the same  general  model  in which  the log-level  of real per capita  GDP
7  As a robustness  check,  we also  estimated  the growth  model  using  contemporaneous  values  of  the
explanatory  variables,  and  then generated  forecasts  by inserting  the actual  future  values  of the explanatory
variables  into the forecasting  equation. This  corresponds  to the unrealistic  assumption  that the  forecaster
has perfect  foresight  for all of  the explanatory  variables  when  producing  growth  forecasts. Not  surprisingly,
(a)  the growth  model  fits somewhat  better  in sample,  and  (b)  the forecasts  generated  by this  model  perform
somewhat  better,  although  not by much.
9follows  a first-order  autoregressive  process  around  a trend. In the time series model,  the
trend  is modelled  as a simple  function  of time  with at most one shift. In the growth
model,  the trend  term is interpreted  as the steady  state of the neoclassical  growth
model, and is proxied  by variables  suggested  by the theory. As a result,  the forecasts
generated  by the growth  model  are based  on more  information  than the time series
model,  since they incorporate  proxies  for the steady  state  for each country. Although  in
general  one would  expect  that this should  lead to superior  forecasts,  this advantage  is to
some  extent  offset  by the fact  that the growth model  forces  the parameters  of the model
to be the same  across  countries,  while  the time series  model  allows  them to differ across
countries 8. Since  the balance  of these  two effects  is ambiguous,  there is no a priori
reason  to prefer  one method  over  the other.
8Attempting  separate  within  country  growth regressions  would  probably  be of limited  usefulness  because  of
insufficient  within-country  variation  in determinants  of long-run  growth  over  our sample  period.
103. Results
In this section,  we provide  a description  of the forecasting  performance  of the
time series  model  and growth model. We begin  by looking  at the how  the various
forecasts  fare for a few specific  countries,  and then provide  a number  of descriptive
statistics  which summarize  the ex post performance  of these  models  for a large  number
of developed  and developing  countries. Finally,  we provide  some comparisons  between
both  these models  and those  reported  in the World Bank's  Unified  Survey.
3.1. A Look  At Individual  Country  Forecasts
It is interesting  to begin  by looking  at forecasts  for a few selected  countries,  in
order to get a sense  of why different  methodologies  lead  to different  forecasts. The  top
left corner  of Figure  1 shows  the actual  log-level  of per capita  GDP for Nigeria,  as well
as forecasts  for the period  1981-1996  based  on both models. In the case of Nigeria,  the
growth model  clearly  outperforms  the time series  model. The time series model
identifies  a trend  break in per  capita GDP around  1970  for Nigeria,  and then  extrapolates
the trend growth  during  the 1970s  into  the 1980s  and 1990s. As a result,  it misses
entirely  the five years of negative  growth  during  the first half of the 1980s  and
subsequent  stagnation  that actually  occurred. In contrast,  the growth regression  fares
much  better  as it in part accounts  for Nigeria's  worse policy  and structural  determinants
in the second  half  of the 1  970s  which had predictive  power  for Nigeria's  subsequent
performance.
However,  it would  be misleading  to conclude  from Figure 1 that policy-based
growth  regressions  are in general  much better  at forecasting  growth. In bottom  left
panel  of Figure 1, we plot  the opposite  case of the Netherlands.  Here,  the growth  model
performs  worse  than the time series model,  predicting  significantly  lower  growth  during
the 1980s  and 1990s  than actually  occurred. There  are also many  cases  where neither
model  does  very well.  For example,  the top right  panel  of Figure 1 plots  the same  graph
for Argentina,  but  this time using  forecasts  based  on information  available  in 1990. Here
the growth model  and the time series model  do equally  poorly  in predicting  the
turnaround  in  Argentina  during  the 1990s  relative  to the 1  980s. Finally,  there are
11countries  such  as the United  States  where  both models  perform  more  or less equally
well (see  the bottom  right panel  of Figure  1).
It is also useful  to distinguish  between  the two models  in terms of their ex ante
forecast  confidence  intervals. To avoid  cluttering  the graphs  excessively,  we show  these
intervals  for Argentina  only, in Figure  2. The most striking  feature  of Figure  2 is that
these  forecast  confidence  intervals  are much  larger  for the growth model  than  for the
time series  model. In particular,  the 90% forecast  interval  for the growth  regression  after
five years  is around  +0.2, which  translates  into  a 90%  confidence  interval  for the average
annual  growth  forecasts  over  this period  of around  ±3.7%  per year ( (1.20)(1'5)-1)=0.037).
In contrast,  for the time series  model  the 90% forecast  interval  is around  ±0.03,  which
translates  into a 90% confidence  interval  for the average  annual  growth  forecasts  over
this period  of around  ±0.6%  per year ( (1.03)( 1'5)-1)=0.0059).  This difference  in the ex
ante  confidence  associated  with  the forecasts  reflects  the fact that the in-sample  fit of
the time series  model is much  better  than  the in-sample  fit of the growth  model. 9
The main lesson  from this first look at the data  is that it is difficult  to say a priori
which  forecasting  method  will do best.  We explore  these  issues more  systematically
below  by looking  at the summary  statistics  of forecast  quality  for all of the countries.and
all of the forecasts  in our  sample.
3.2 Cross-Country  Comparisons  of Forecast  Models
We now tum to a more  formal  and systematic  evaluation  of the ex post
performance  of the forecasts  generated  by these  methods. We use  two simple  statistics
which capture  the bias and mean squared  error of the forecasts.1 0 For each country  i,
we measure  the bias of an h-period  ahead  forecast  as the cumulative  sum of the
Since  the growth  model  forces  the autoregressive  parameter  p and  the variance  of the error term  v  to be
the same  across  all countries,  the forecast  confidence  intervals  are  the same  for all countries  (recall
Equation  (9)). In  contrast,  the forecast  confidence  intervals  for the time  series  model  vary across  countries,
as these  estimated  parameters  also  vary  across  countries. Neither  set  of confidence  intervals  reflects  the
uncertainty  associated  with  the estimates  of  the parameters  themselves.
We do not use 'rationality"  tests  to evaluate  forecasts,  as is  often  done  in the literature. In this literature,
a forecast  is accepted  as 'rational" if there  are no variable  available  at the time  that the forecast  is made
which  have  explanatory  power  for the subsequent  forecast  errors. In practice,  these  tests are  of limited
usefulness  in selecting  between  alternative  forecasting  models  since  there  is a potentially  unlimited  number
of explanatory  variables  which  need  to be considered  before  a forecast  can shown  as rational.
12forecast  errors. In order  to make  this comparable  across  countries,  we scale  this sum by
the actual outcomes,  resulting  in the following  cumulative  forecast  error  statistic:
E  (Yi  t+Sjt  Yi  t+s)
(1  0)  CFE  = s-  h
YYi,t+s
S=1
All other  things equal,  it is natural  to prefer  forecasts  with cumulative  forecast  errors  near
zero.
Similarly,  for each country  i we measure  the variability  or precision  of an h-step
ahead  forecast  using  the sum of squared  forecast  errors. To make  this comparable
across  countries,  we scale  it by the sum of squared  actual  outcomes,  resulting  in what is
known  as the Theil U-statistic:
h
E  (Yi.,+sjt Yi  t+s)
(11)  TUjt  s-  h
Y.Y,t+s
s=1
All other  things  equal,  we would  prefer  forecasting  methods  with low Theil U-statistics,
since the variability  of the forecast  errors  is low relative  to the variability  of real per capita
GDP. 11
For each country,  we calculate  the CFE and TU for both forecasting  models,
based  on information  available  through  1980,  and through 1990, for every possible
forecast  horizon. In Figures  3-6  we provide  a graphical  overview  of these  many
summary  statistics  of forecast performance.  In Figure  3 we consider  the sample  of 73
countries  for which we are able to produce  forecasts  using  all five methods  in 1980.  12
We plot  time on the horizontal  axis, and on the vertical  axis, we plot the median  across
countries  of the two measures  of forecast  quality  discussed  above,  the CFE (upper
1  As is well  known,  the MSE  of a forecast  can be written  as the sum of the variance  of the forecast  errors
pius  the bias  squared. As such  it reflects  a particular  weighting  of bias  and precision  in assessing  forecast
quality. However,  for many  purposes  the bias  in a forecast  is  of independent  interest. For this  reason  we
report  both  the  cumulative  forecast  error  and  the  Theil  U statistic  for  each  country.
13panel),  and the TU (lower panel). We report  the medians  rather  than  the means,  since
for some  countries,  one model  or the other  can deliver  "crazy"  forecasts  resulting  in very
large  TUs or CFEs (in absolute  value).
In the upper  panel  of Figure  3, the time series model  and the growth model  have
very similar  performance  in terms of the CFE statistic,  which measures  the bias in
forecasts. Both models  significantly  over-predict  real per capita GDP -- and do so
increasingly  over  time 13. This occurs  because,  on average,  both  models  do a rather
poor  job of predicting  the worldwide  slowdown  in  growth during  the first half of the
1  980s. To interpret  the magnitude  of this bias,  recall  that the vertical  axis measures
logarithm  of real per capita  GDP.  Since,  for example,  the cumulative  median  bias in the
level of forecasted  real per capita  GDP after  five years  is around  7% of per capita  GDP,
this translates  into an upward  bias in average  annual  growth  forecasts  over  this period  of
around  1.4%  per  year ( (1.07)(115)-1)=0.0136).
Tuming  to the TU statistics  in the lower  panel,  there  is a somewhat  clearer
distinction  between  the two models. At all forecast  horizons,  the growth model  delivers  a
lower  variablity  of forecast  errors,  as reflected  in lower  TU statistics. This gap between
the two models  widens  over  time, suggesting  that the relative  performance  of the growth
model  is better  for longer-term  growth  forecasts. In contrast,  at short horizons,  e.g. less
than 5 years,  the performance  of the two models  is rather  similar. Somewhat
surprisingly,  the relative  performance  of these models  according  to both criteria  is similar
in a smaller  sample  of 59 developing  countries  for which we have forecasts  from both
models. The graphs  summarizing  these results  are omitted  for brevity.
In Figure  4 we do the same  exercise,  but  for forecasts  based  on information
available  through 1990,  using  a slightly  larger  sample  of 82 countries. As in the 1  980s,
the forecasts  of both models  are on average  biased  upwards,  although  less so than in
the 1980s  forecasts  (note  that the units  of the vertical  axis are very different  in Figures  4
and 3). The median  bias in the forecasts  is never  greater  than 0.4% of GDP.  In
12 Although  we  can  produce  the  time  series  forecasts  for  all 112  countries  in our  data  set,  we have  complete
data  on  all of  the  explanatory  variables  required  for  the  growth  regression  in 1980  for  only  73  countries,  and
for 82  countries  in 1990.
14contrast  to the 1  980s forecasts,  the growth  model  does  somewhat  beKter  than  the time
series  model,  both in terms of bias (see  the CFEs  in the upper  panel)  and in terms of
variability  (see  the TUs in the lower  panel).
In Figure  5, we repeat  the information  in Figure  4, but for a smaller  set of only
developing  countries  for which  we also have the Unified  Survey  forecasts  produced  by
the World  Bank in 1990.14  During  this period,  the performance  of the Unified  Survey
forecasts  was remarkably  similar  to that of the other  two models,  both  in terms of bias
and mean  squared  error. Interestingly,  there is little  evidence  that the Unified  Survey's
long term forecasts  are biased  upwards  during  this period. This is in contrast  to other
findings  that World Bank  forecasts  are typically  over-optimistic  (Ghosh  and Minhas
(1993)). However,  given the large  differences  in the performances  of forecasts  based  on
different  information  sets,  it is premature  to conclude  that this finding  is general.
Thus far, we have seen that the median  (across  countries)  performance  of all
three models  considered  here are  quite similar,  with  the growth regression  perhaps
having  a slight advantage  over  the other  two alternatives.  A natural  question  is whether
any of the differences  in median  performance  of these models  are either economically  or
statistically  significant. One  way to answer  this question  is to look at the entire cross-
section  of CFE and TU statistics  at every  forecast  horizon,  in order to obtain  a sense  of
whether  the differences  in medians  are representative.  We do this in Figure  6, for the
CFE statistics  in Figure  5.  In the first panel,  we reproduce  the first panel  of Figure  5, but
add vertical  bars  to the CFEs  for the time series  model  indicating  the interquartile  range
of the cross-sectional  distribution  of the CFE statistics. In order not to clutter  the graph
excessively,  in the next  two panels  we report  the same  information,  but instead  for the
CFEs of the growth  model, and the Unified  Survey  forecasts,  separately. The most
striking  feature  of these graphs  is that the cross-sectional  distribution  of these  statistics
is extremely  dispersed. For each model,  the interquartile  range  of the CFE statistics
swamps  any  differences  in the medians  of these  statistics,  suggesting  that differences  in
13  A potentially  useful  thing  to do (in order  to decrease  this  observed  bias)  would  be a 'Dynamic  Estimation"
of both  of our  models,  where  estimation  is achieved  by minimizing  the in-sample  counterpart  of the desired
multi-step  ahead  forecast  horizon,  which  thus produces  a different  parameter  estimate  per  forecast  horizon.
(And  thus avoids  raising  our  estimated  parameters  to powers  (see  equations  (2), (8)),  which  could  seriously
exacerbate  bias  problems  for large  forecast  horizons.)
15median  performance  are highly  unlikely  to be of statistical  or practical  relevance. Similar
graphs indicating  the cross-country  dispersion  in the TU statistics  (not  shown  for brevity)
lead  to a similar  conclusion  that the cross-country  variation  in model performance  is
large  relative  to the differences  in median  performance.
Finally,  we ask  whether  the relative  performance  of the various  models  is stable
over time  for a particular  country. This question  is relevant  if one is interested  in
producing  forecasts  for a particular  country  and it is necessary  to choose  one model
over another. In this case, it would be useful  to know  whether  the fact that, for example,
the growth  model  outperformed  the time series model  for that country  in the past is a
good predictor  of the future relative  performance  of the two models. To answer  this
question,  we  focus on the five-year  ahead  forecasts  of real per capita GDP  generated  in
1980  and in 1990,  for both  the time series  and the growth  model. We then use  the Theil-
U statistics  for each country  to assess  the relative  performance  of the two models  in
each of the two forecasting  periods. We summarize  the results  with a two-way
classification  of countries,  indentifying  which  model  dominated  the other (in  the sense of
having  a lower  TU statistic)  in each of the two years. The results  of this calculation  are
summarized  in Table  2 for the set of 73 countries  common  to both samples.
Unconditionally,  the probability  that the time series  model  outperforms  the growth model
is around  0.44, corresponding  to 33 out of 73 countries  for the period  1981-85,  and 31
out of 73 countries  in the period  1991-95.
The main question  of interest  is whether  the time series model  consistently
outperforms  the growth  model  in the same  countries  over  time. The remainder  of the
table indicates  that this is not the case. In only 13 out of 73 countries  does the time
series model  outperform  the growth  model  in both  periods,  and the converse  occurs  in
only 22 out of 73 countries. For the remaining  countries,  one model  fares relatively  well
in the one period  but not so in  the other. In fact, a chi-squared  test of the null hypothesis
that relative  performance  over  the period  1981-85  is uncorrelated  with relative
performance  over the period  1991-95  (i.e. of the independence  of the rows  and columns)
yields a p-value  of 0.63. This comfortably  rejects  the notion  that, within countries,  past
relative  forecast  performance  is any guarantee  of future forecast  performance.
14  These  forecasts  are  taken  from the 1991  Unified  Survey,  so that most  data  through  1990  would have
been  available  at the time these  forecasts  were  made. In this  version  of the Unified  Survey,  1  0-year
164.  Implications
In this section  we take up two questions  suggested  by the results  of the previous
section. First,  given  that both  the time series  and the growth  models  perform
comparably,  is it possible  to combine  them in some  way  to arrive  at better  forecasts?
Second,  does either model  perform  well in absolute  (as opposed  to relative)  terms?
4.1 Can  Alternative  Forecasting  Models  "Learn"  From  Each Other?
Thus  far, we have seen that there is little  clear evidence  suggesting  that we
should  select  one model  over  another  as a forecasting  tool. Rather  than restrict
ourselves  to selecting  one model  over another,  a more  constructive  approach  is to ask
whether  some  combination  of models  leads  to better  forecasts. We do this using  tests  of
forecast  combination  and encompassing.  Intuitively,  these tests  ask whether  alternative
forecasting  models  can "learn"  from each other. If they do, this suggests  that superior
forecasts  can be obtained  by combining  the two models  in some  way.
Formally,  suppose  that both  the time series and the growth model  generate
forecasts  that are informative  for future real per capita  GDP,  so that we can  write  future
real per capita  GDP as a linear  combination  of the two forecasts  plus an error term:
(12)  yi  t+s = a+  j3  yt+sjt  +(-f).it+  sIt  +Uit+s
where  the superscripts  TS and GR differentiate  between  the forecasts  of the time series
and growth models.  15  We can  then test  the null hypothesis  that the time series  model
forecast-encompasses  the growth  model  by testing  the null  that ,B=0.  The intuition  for
this test is straightforward,  since it simply  asks  whether  the variation  in the growth-
regression  based  forecasts  that is orthogonal  to the time series  forecasts  has any  useful
explanatory  power  for actual outcomes.  If it does not, then  the time series model
"encompasses"  the growth  model in  the sense  that the growth  model's  forecasts  provide
average  annual  growth  projections  were produced,  and  we use these  average  annual  growth  rates  to
forecast  growth  for every  year  through  1996.
17no additional  predictive  power  for actual  output. Conversely,  we can test whether  the
growth model  encompasses  the  time series  model  by testing  whether  P=1.
We implement  these  tests  for the time series and growth models  discussed
above  as follows. For every  forecast  horizon,  we estimate  Equation  (12) cross-
sectionally,  and test the two null hypotheses  that each  model  encompasses  the other.  16
The results  of the cross-sectional  regressions  are shown  in Table 3. In general,  we reject
the null hypothesis  that either  model  encompasses  the other  at short forecast  horizons,
suggesting  that both  models  can benefit  from incorporating  features  of the other.
Interestingly,  as the forecast  horizon  increases,  we do not reject  the null hypothesis  that
the growth  model  encompasses  the time series model  (i.e. 3=1), but not the converse.
This is consistent  with the notion  that long-run  growth  regressions  do a better  job of
predicting  long-term  growth.
These  results  strongly  suggest  that there  are benefits  to combining  the
information  from both  forecasting  models. However,  it is less  clear exactly  how this
should  be done. A simple approach  would  be to use some  weighted average  of
forecasts  from the two models.  There is some  empirical  evidence  in other contexts  that
weighted  (or even unweighted)  averages  can outperform  the components  of the average
(e.g. Stock  & Watson  (1998)).  However,  Diebold  (1989)  stresses  that there is no
guarantee  that this will be the case  in general. Since neither  model  individually  does a
very good  job at capturing  the "true"  underlying  data generating  process,  there  is no
reason  to believe  that a combination  of the two will do so on a consistent  basis. For
example,  the large  negative  intercepts  in the encompassing  regressions  for the 1980s
forecasts  reflect  the large  ex post positive  bias in these  forecasts. However,  if we were
to use  this information  to systematically  lower  all growth  forecasts  for the 1990s  (as the
encompassing  regression  might  suggest),  we would  have ended  up significantly
underpredicting  growth in the 1990s.
15  The restriction  that the coefficients  on the  two models  sum  to one is not essential. Estimating  these
encompassing  regressions  without  such a restriction  leads  to very similar  results.
16  We also  carry  out these  tests using  the time series  of forecast  errors  for each  country,  from the forecasts
based  on information  available  through  1980. For  each  country,  we estimated  rolling  regressions,  starting
with the time  series  of the first 10  forecast  errors  over  the period  1981-90,  and continuing  through  the entire
time series  of errors  through  1997. The  results  of this  exercise  were  consistent  with the cross-sectional
results. At short  horizons,  neither  model  encompassed  the other. However,  it was more  likely  that  the
growth  model  encompassed  the time series  model  at long horizons  than  the other  way around.
18Instead,  a more  compelling  approach  is to combine  the information  sets on which
the forecasts  are based,  rather  than combine  the forecasts  themselves (Clements  and
Hendry  (1998),  Diebold  (1989)). For example,  a natural  way  to combine  the two models
would  be to consider  a hybrid  time series  model  which  (a) includes  additional
explanatory  variables  that our  time series model  omits, and (b) relaxes  the restriction  of
the growth models  that the parameter  estimates  are equal  across  countries. An
example  of such  a modelling  strategy  might  be a non-structural  vector  autoregression  in
several  key macroeconomic  variables,  estimated  country-by-country.  Forecasts  based
on such a combined  information  set are more  likely  to encompasses  alternatives  since
they making  optimal  use of all of the (useful)  available  information  in both  information
sets.
4.2 Formal  Tests  of Predictive  Failure
Thus  far, our emphasis  has been  on comparing  the relative  performance  of
alternative  forecasting  models. We now turn to a rather  different  question: is the
absolute  performance  of these  forecasting  models  adequate? Altematively,  is the ex
post performance  of these  forecasting  models  good enough  (or bad enough)  that we
should  continue  to use some  combination  of these models  (or search  for other
forecasting  models)?
In principle,  this question  can  be answered  using  the test of predictive  failure
developed  by Box and Tiao (1976).  Intuitively,  this test asks  whether  the deviations
between  forecasts  and actuality  are large  relative  to the forecast  confidence  intervals
generated  ex ante. To see how this works,  consider  the case  of Argentina,  where  we
have  already  seen the forecast  confidence  intervals  in Figure  2.  For the case of a one-
step ahead  forecast,  the Box-Tiao  test simply asks  whether  the actual  outcome  of real
per capita  GDP  falls within  the ex ante  confidence  interval  generated  by the forecaster.
If it does,  we do not reject  the null hypothesis  that the forecasting  model  is correctly
specified,  since,  roughly  speaking,  the actual  outcome  fell within  the range  that was
expected  a priori.  This, however,  should  not be  taken as an endorsement  of the model
either,  since  failure to reject  the null hypothesis  may simply  reflect large  ex ante
19confidence  intervals  generated  by a model  that fits very poorly  within-sample. If in
contrast  the actual outcome  falls outside  the range  predicted  by the forecaster,  the Box-
Tiao test rejects  the model.
In the case of Argentina,  we see  that for the one-year  ahead  forecast,  i.e. the
forecast  of real per capita  GDP in 1991  based  on information  in 1990,  falls inside  the
confidence  interval  of the growth  model,  but outside  the confidence  interval  of the time
series model. The Box-Tiao  test therefore  suggests  that we should  reject  the time series
model,  but not the growth  model,  as a forecasting  tool. We have implemented  the
version  of the Box-Tiao  test appropriate  for multi-step  forecasts  for all countries,  and we
find a similar  pattern  to that observed  in Argentina. 17 For the great  majority  of countries,
the Box-Tiao  test suggests  that we should  reject  the time series model.  For the growth
model,  the Box-Tiao  test rejects  the growth  model  for about  half of the countries,  and
fails  to reject  for the other  half.  18
Is this conclusion  warranted?  As noted  above,  the Box  - Tiao test may  fail to
reject  a model  simply because  the model  is very imprecise  ex ante. Indeed,  in our
context,  and as is clear  from Figure  2, the main reason  why the growth  model  is not
rejected  by the Box-Tiao  test is because  the ex-ante  forecast  confidence  intervals
associated  with this model  are  so large  as to render  the accompanying  growth  forecasts
virtually  meaningless.  We have already  noted  that the growth  regression  typically
generates  ex ante  forecast  intervals  of plus  or minus  four percent  per year  around  a
typical  5-year  ahead  growth  forecast. This spans almost  the entire range of actual
growth  performance  in most periods. Conversely,  the time series  model  fares relatively
poorly  according  to the Box-Tiao  criterion  for assessing  the significance  of predictive
failure because  the ex ante  confidence  intervals  associated  with the time series model
are  far smaller  than those  of the growth  model.  This reflects  the fact that the time series
model  tends  to "over-fit"  the data  in sample. Given  that the parameters  of the time
series model  are  typically  rather  imprecisely  estimated  (especially  the date of the trend
break),  forecast  confidence  intervals  which  take this into account  would  give a more
17  In  particular,  Box  and  Tiao  (1976)  show  that fora process  with  Gaussian  innovations,  e±'Qlet has  a
X 2(h)  distribution,  where  et  is  the  hxl vector  of  forecast  errors  through  h and  CI=E[et  et']. Given  the
expressions  for the forecast  errors  in Equations  (3)  and (9)  and the corresponding  estimates  of pj, it is
possible  to obtain  an estimate  of Q and compute  the appropriate  test statistic.
20reasonable  picture  of the ex ante  uncertainty  of this model's  forecasts. As a result,  the
Box-Tiao  test would  be less likely  to reject  this model  as a forecasting  tool.
18  Recall  that the forecast  confidence  intervals  are  the same  across  countries  for the growth  model. For  the
time series  model,  there  is some  variation,  but since  in general  the time series  model  fits the data  very  well
in-sample,  the forecast  confidence  intervals  tend  to be quite  small  for all countries.
215. Conclusions
In this paper,  we have  considered  the relative  performance  of two simple
forecasting  models  for real per  capita GDP  in a large  sample  of developed  and
developing  countries: a univariate  time series model  for real per capita  GDP, and a
cross-country  growth  regression  model.  The most striking  finding  of this paper is that
neither  model  clearly  dominates  as a forecasting  tool. Median  (across  countries)
differences  in the forecasting  performance  of the two models  are typically  very small
relative  to the cross-country  variation  in relative  model  performance. Moreover,  both
absolute  and relative  model  performance  is very unstable  over  time. Both models
significantly  overpredict  growth  in the 1980s,  but do not in the 1990s. Within  countries,
past relative  forecast  performance  is uncorrelated  with future relative  forecast
performance.
These  results  indicate  that it is very difficult  to choose  the "best"  forecasting
model  for a particular  country  or group of countries. Instead  of attempting  such a choice,
our results  suggest  that there  are potential  benefits  from combining  the two forecasting
methodologies.  Forecast  encompassing  tests indicate  that the forecasts  of both  models
are  jointly informative  for actual outcomes,  especially  at shorter  horizons. A natural  way
to proceed  would be  to combine  the information  sets from the two models  in some  way.
In particular,  vector  autoregressions  in a small  set of key macroeconomic  variables,
estimated  country-by-country,  may improve  over  the forecast  performance  of both
models.  The advantage  of such  an approach  over  the univariate  time series  models  is
that it draws on a larger  information  set. This approach  can potentially  also improve
over  forecasts  based  on cross-country  growth  regressions  by relaxing  the restrictive
assumption  that the parameters  of the model  are equal  across  countries.
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23Table  1: Growth  Regression  Results
Dependent  variable  is In(real  per  capita  GDP)
1980  1990
OLS  GMM  OLS  GMM
Constant  --  2.227  --  -0.526
(1.168)*  (0.410)
Lagged  ln(real per capita GDP)  0.923  0.748  0.940  0.862
(0.01  9)**  (0.118)**  (0.015)***  (0.053)***
ln(Population  Growth + 0.05)  -0.253  -0.247  -0.330  -0.683
(0.099)**  (0.224)  (0.071)***  (0.113)***
ln(lnvestmentVGDP)  0.076  0.324  0.053  0.076
(0.021)***  (0.125)**  (0.017)**  (0.044)*
ln(lnflation)  0.069  0.295  -0.166  0.003
(0.115)  (0.230)  (0.068)**  (0.132)
(Exports + Imports)/GDP  0.06  -0.281  0.012  0.046
(0.033)*  (0.191)  (0.020)  (0.051)
In(1+Black  Market  Premium)  -0.076  -0.124  -0.061  -0.075
(0.064)  (0.149)  (0.037)*  (0.040)*
P-Value  for Sargan  Test  of OIDR  0.859  0.238
P-Value  for no SOSC  n/a  0.716
24Table  2: Persistence  of Relative  Forecast  Performance
1991-95
TS  Dominates  GR  Dominates  Total
1981  TS  Dominates  13  20  33
-1985  GR  Dominates  18  22  40
Total  31  42  73
P-Value  for Chi-Squared  Test  of Independence:  0.63
Notes: This table reports  the relative  forecast  performance  of the time series  model
(TS)  and the growth model  (GR),  for 5-year  growth  forecasts  for 1981-85  and 1991-95.
The cells of the table indicate  the number  of countries  for which  the TU statistic  of the
TB model  is lower  than that of the GR model  (TS Dominates),  and conversely  the
number  of countries  for which  the TU statistic  of the GR model  is lower (GR Dominates)
during  the indicated  forecast  periods.
25Table  3:  Forecast  Encompassing  Tests
P-Value  for:
ax  se(a)  s  _eS_  Ho:  0=0  Ho:  0=1
Forecast Origin  = 1980
1981  -0.015  0.006  0.501  0.179  0.005  0.005
1982  -0.057  0.01  0.527  0.163  0.001  0.004
1983  -0.095  0.016  0.654  0.165  0.000  0.036
1984  -0.112  0.02  0.763  0.154  0.000  0.124
1985  -0.121  0.022  0.71  0.138  0.000  0.036
1986  -0.124  0.026  0.783  0.132  0.000  0.100
1987  -0.132  0.029  0.83  0.127  0.000  0.181
1988  -0.133  0.032  0.799  0.122  0.000  0.099
1989  -0.136  0.036  0.804  0.121  0.000  0.105
1990  -0.14  0.039  0.821  0.117  0.000  0.126
1991  -0.15  0.04  0.838  0.109  0.000  0.137
1992  -0.164  0.044  0.854  0.108  0.000  0.176
1993  -0.177  0.047  0.88  0.106  0.000  0.258
1994  -0.177  0.05  0.897  0.105  0.000  0.327
1995  -0.166  0.052  0.917  0.101  0.000  0.411
1996  -0.149  0.055  0.934  0.099  0.000  0.505
1997  -0.164  0.057  0.89  0.099  0.000  0.267
Forecast Origin  = 1990
1991  -0.004  0.005  0.603  0.274  0.028  0.147
1992  -0.013  0.009  0.563  0.237  0.018  0.065
1993  -0.016  0.012  0.797  0.221  0.000  0.358
1994  -0.007  0.013  0.766  0.181  0.000  0.196
1995  0.004  0.014  0.807  0.157  0.000  0.219
1996  0.021  0.017  0.842  0.152  0.000  0.299
1997  0.028  0.017  0.885  0.135  0.000  0.394
Notes:  This table reports  the results  from estimating  the following  regression:
Y o.  = a +  it  + (1-,B)  *t+st  + ui,t+s
cross-sectionally  for each of the indicated  years. The last two columns  report  the p-
values  corresponding  to the null hypothesis  that the time series model  encompasses
the growth  model  (0=0)  and that the growth  model  encompasses  the time series  model
(p=12).
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Notes:  This  figure  plots  predicted  and  actual  real  per  capita  GDP  for  the  indicated
countries.  The  vertical  line  in  each  graph  indicates  the  end  of  the  sample  period
over  which  the  model  was  estimated.
27Figure  2:
Forecast  Confidence  Intervals  for Argentina
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Notes:  This  figure  plots  actual  and  predicted  real  per  capita  GDP  for  Argentina,
using  information  available  through  1990.  The  vertical  bars  indicate  a 90%  forecast
confidence  interval.
28Figure 3:
Evaluating  Forecast  Performance
(Forecasts  based  on information  available  through  1980)
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Notes: These  graphs  report  the median  cumulate  forecast  error and Theil U-
statistic  at each forecast  horizon. Medians  are  taken across  the set of 73 countries
for which  both  forecasts  are available.
29Figure  4:
Evaluating  Forecast  Performance
(Forecasts  based  on information  available  through 1990)
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Notes: These  graphs  report  the median  cumulate  forecast  error and Theil U-
statistic  at each forecast  horizon. Medians  are taken  across  the set of 82 countries
for which both  forecasts  are available.
30Figure  5:
Evaluating  Forecast  Performance
(Forecasts  based  on information  available  through 1990,
Sample  of developing  countries  for which Unified  Survey  forecasts  are available)
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Notes: These  graphs  report  the median  cumulate  forecast  error  and Theil U-
statistic  at each forecast  horizon. Medians  are taken  across  the set of 53 countries
for which all three forecasts  are  available.
31Figure  6:
Are Differences  in Forecast  Performance  Significant?






























Notes: These  graphs  indicate  the median,  first, and third quartiles  of the
cumulative  forecast  errors  associated  with  the  three  models,  for  the  set  of 53
countries  for  which  these  forecasts  are  available.
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